Either God is in the whole of Nature, with no gaps, or He's not there at all.
- Charles Alfred Coulson, Science and Christian Belief
Today, I’d like to make something
of a rejoinder to last week’s post, where I discussed the propensity of
the human mind to boggle at the unknowable and its’ tendency to fill the void
with what – to it – is at least comprehensible. It was a specific point about intellectual
humility in the face of a mystery that may be genuinely unsolvable. Today I would like to make a distinction
between this, and a superficially reasonable but ultimately misguided argument
that sees any acknowledged gap in current
knowledge as ripe for invoking supernature in natural explanations. Misguided
for at least two reasons, which I’ll come to shortly. In discussing the second of
these reasons, I’d also like to bring in a related style of argument: one that
chalks off a region of the intellectual battlefield, and tries to limit
discussion to where it thinks it has home-field advantage. It may not always be
explicitly religious, but it is among the repertoire of those that feel their religious
beliefs require them to engage on one side or another in a given empirical
debate. As such, today’s post is going to be a bit longer than usual. But as
it’s also likely to be my last for the year, so I hope you’ll indulge me: it is
nearly Christmas after all. Here’s hoping you have a great Christmas and New
Year, and thanks to all for reading and commenting.
So, why misguided? Well, firstly, it’s worth considering
that the disparaging term ‘God of the gaps’ was not created as an epithet to be hurled by non-believers. Rather, Christian
writers – including the one quoted above – originated the concept to criticize
what they saw as the belittling of god into an occasional wonderworker,
constrained by the borders of human knowledge rather than immanent in the
entirety of the cosmos and its natural processes. As they point out, such
gaps have a tendency of closing. One example of this – which also serves to
show that such an inclination is not only the province of small minds – concerns Sir Isaac
Newton. Newton, among his many achievements, is credited for deriving his
Universal Law of Gravitation
from the fact that the planets orbit the sun not in perfect circles, but in
ellipses. He showed
how such ellipses would result from an attractive force – gravity – that
operated in specific ways in relation to the masses in question and the
distances between them. He rightly saw, however, that pull of the sun is not
the only influence that should act on the planets and other orbiting bodies: they
should also act upon one another. Failing to see how to reconcile such
perturbations with the apparent stability of the solar system, not least of
which the fact that the planets orbit within a fairly narrow plane, he invoked
god to fine-tune the celestial system:
"The […] Planets are revolv'd about the Sun, in circles concentric with the Sun, and with motions directed towards the same parts, and almost in the same plane. […] But it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give birth to so many regular motions. […] This most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets, and Comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being."- Sir Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica
In a sense, Newton was right. Planetary bodies do perturb one another,
and these influences add up and cancel out in chaotic ways: indeed there are a
number of scenarios that see such influences rendering dramatic changes to the
solar system in the long term. What he failed to see was the relatively short
period of human-scale time he was
attributing stability to, and the development of ways in which – sans god – it
might be explain materialistically. The orbital plane, for instance, is thought
to be due to the way star systems coalesce out of nebulae that are themselves
rotating, and flattens out into a disk as it does so. The point here is not
that the modern forms of the nebular hypothesis are ‘proven’, or complete, or likely to be the final word on the subject.
Rather, the point is the extent of the unknown has shrunk. By constraining your
idea god to such dwindling foxholes you subject it to a death of a thousand
cuts as the borders are inevitably tested at every place they can by
incrementally advancing knowledge.
The second way such piecemeal objections backfire is more
subtle: it concerns the inevitable conceptual acrobatics required to shore them
up against the shifting, combined weight of the facts they are subject to if
they are to be credible as empirical explanations. Religious ideas – particularly those that
hold dear the role of direct divine intervention in the phenomenal world – may be deeply and profoundly meaningful in the context of how a
person chooses to view their place in the world. But ‘god did it’ has no explanatory
power in an empirical context. What
predictions arise from it? Under what conditions can it be falsified? By
staking out some cherished problem with ‘Science’ as the home of your god,
you’ve chosen the arena – physical phenomena – and the weapon – empiricism. You
don’t then get to restrict the battle to only those facts that suit your case:
if your god is touted as the solution to a scientific problem, then it has to
bear the weight of the same facts subject to a godless explanation. Two topics
that are controversial – but shouldn’t be – at least partly because of this
brand of special pleading are evolution by natural selection, and anthropogenic
climate change.
It’s fairly easy to see why evolution by natural selection
might be perceived as threatening by people who feel their doctrines insist
upon an intelligent designer who undertook creation in the geologically recent
past. Intelligent Design, distancing itself from the charge that it’s the respectable face of creationism,
asks a seemingly reasonable question: is the apparent design evident in the
adaptations of complex organic phenomena the result of a genuine intelligent
designer or of a mindless statistical process. Seemingly reasonable because the
evidence is usually in the form of ‘irreducible complexity’: some biological
phenomena is held up as being too complex to have arisen by a gradual,
accretory process. All the better if it’s intuitively difficult to see how each
and every stage in that process could have conferred evolutionary advantage:
the old “what good is half a wing” chestnut. In reality, Intelligent Design is the God
of the Gaps writ small in the context of biology, and runs into trouble on
exactly the same grounds. The human eye used to be a favorite example. But in
the context of an extensive characterization of processes that might take one
from the photosensitivity evident even in unicellular organisms to complex image
forming optical instruments – possibly even multiple times in different taxa – this ground has
been largely conceded. Apparently, they always were talking about the minutiae of biochemical reactions required
for light sensitivity.
Young Earth Creationism
provides a clearer example of the distortion and special pleading that becomes
necessary when one has an a priori claim to defend. In a way, as its purpose
is to justify a specific, literalist conception of the Genesis creation
narrative it’s actually a better candidate as an empirical hypothesis in
formal terms. This is because in contrast to the vague claims of Intelligent
Design, Young Earth Creationism specifies the conditions under which it can be
falsified. It makes quantitative claims about the age of the earth, the
descent of all peoples from Noah’s family and the diaspora of human culture
from a focal point at the Tower of Babel just a few short millennia ago. On the
other hand, it’s this very specificity that requires it to tie itself in knots
to try and maintain the illusion that these claims are not contravened by the
available evidence. In proportion to the extent of empirical scaffolding that
supports the scientific consensus on the age of the earth and other
inconvenient truths, creationists need to tell ever more extensive just-so
stories to justify their cherished conclusions. The list of
required special dispensations is long, and doesn’t just contain the
predictable anti-evolutionism which is its most common expression, but would
have to include at the very least the cosmology of star and planetary
formation, the physics of radioactivity, molecular genetics in general and human
genetics in particular, paleobiology,
geology, archaeology, anthropology, linguistics and so on. Again, the
point here isn’t that the current model accepted by science is the revealed, singular
truth and has it all explained. Modern evolutionary biology is a distributed,
convergent discipline where a provisional, constantly evolving perspective
draws on multiple lines of evidence and an array of data,
to make testable claims about integrative, parsimonious mechanisms.
Furthermore, I’m not claiming that
religious belief requires opposition to the concept of evolution by natural
selection: that the two are always and forever mutually incompatible. It’s just
that, in the words of biologist and Russian Orthodox Christian Theodosius
Dobzhansky, nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.
Some do claim an incompatibility and
choose not to identify their god with the grand sweep of nature and the
symphony of its material processes. Instead, they make oddly specific and surely
blasphemous claims that their god, who put the stars on their courses and gave
electrons their quirks, ran out of ideas when it came to the hindquarters of certain beetles or the motive equipment of certain viruses.
“As long as the earth endures,
seedtime and harvest,
cold and heat,
summer and winter,
day and night
will never cease.”Genesis 8:22, The Holy Bible, New International Version
It’s harder to see what religion has to do with anthropogenic
climate change. One suspects religiously
inspired resistance is due in part to the implication of a world with no one at
the controls – a world whose rhythms and cycles can be sent spinning off course
by human actions. At least in the debates I’ve engaged in, citing specifically
scriptural reasons for the falsity of climate science is rare. But it does happen:
in this video we can see American senators and representatives advancing the claim since god
is at the wheel, and he has promised that the earth will be made fruitful for
our benefit until such a time as He decides to draw down the curtain, human
actions can’t possibly endanger the stability of the climate. Indeed, in
addition to the section of Genesis quoted in the video and reproduced above,
this promise is made explicit in chapter 9, versus 1-17:
a covenant with Noah signed with a rainbow.
More commonly I think religious perspectives are one among a range of drives
that lead - in some people some of the time - to a general resistance. The
expression of these specific, ring-fenced objections is - if not specifically
religious – at least subject to the same modus operandi described in previous
examples. Consider a seemingly reasonable objection known as ‘the pause’: the claim
that there has been only insignificant warming since 1998. If the model of climate
change that attributes modern warming trends to human activity is correct, an alleged
lull in this effect is an intuitively appealing challenge to that thesis: until you ask which trends specifically, and based
on which data? In the context of
normal conversation ‘insignificant’ means something like ‘not very much’ or ‘not
very important’. For a scientist, however, ‘significance’ has a specific
meaning relating to the ability of a given statistical method to demonstrate an effect
in a given data set: detecting deviation from chance in the context of the
variability of that data. For the period in question changes in global surface air temperatures have been
rather sluggish: see the reddish-brown bit of the first graph in this article.
But is that the only trend worth considering? As the same article explains,
warming has continued unabated if we consider the heat content of the oceans as well. As I said, ‘significance’
has a specific meaning in lieu of the variability of the data in question. Its
worth considering were the variability in some trends might come from. One of
the short-term wiggles imposed on longer-term trends in temperature relates to ocean cycles,
and the fact that there have been a preponderance of surface-cooling La NiƱa events since 1999. Thus, if we consider all the relevant facts – especially recent developments
that give a clearer picture of warming even in terms of surface temperatures - 'the pause' loses some of its luster.
We can also ask: what is special about the period in question, why look for a
trend in that stretch of times specifically? In the context of noisy data - where short-term
variability is imposed upon longer-term trends - it’s always possible to chose
precisely the period that gives the answer you want. But it’s up to you explain
just why a period is relevant. The scientific consensus has specific arguments
tying the modern temperature trend to the footprints of anthropogenic climate influence.
Can the same be said of 'the pause'? Healthy skepticism is the lifeblood of science, but denialism in all its guises
is evident every time you see the cherry-picking of data to serve a pre-conceived
hypothesis.
| The Escalator, by Skeptical Science |
One might argue that the retreat to smaller and more specific
gaps is merely the flip-side of the scientific method: a modification and
adaption to new facts as they appear. But there is a difference.A good
scientific theory is a knowingly provisional statement about the picture supplied by a combination of the known facts and known mechanisms. A new
theory in the face of new facts is not the defeat of the previous theory, but a realization of the very point of the scientific method. In contrast, arguments
that rely solely on cherished ‘gaps’, are claims about what is unknowable, or
areas that will never be amenable to science.
Thus, the change of a claim about an irreducible, unknowable gap is an
admission of defeat: the thesis is actively disproven. The retreat to a smaller
claim is forced upon proponents, not accommodated by them.
As I’ve tried to stress again and again in this post, I am
not saying that current hypotheses about cosmology, evolution and climate
change are an automatic givens that brook no dispute. Nor am I saying there is
a necessary tension between these hypotheses and a spiritual vision of the
world. Neither am I attributing this specific type of gap argument – which ultimately
makes its home in and relies on ignorance – to all religious persons, or all
religious arguments. One wonders about the extent to which these
misunderstanding and misuses of scientific fact and method is due to the
distance between the common language uses of certain terms, and their meanings
in relation to science. For a scientist, a ‘law’ is a mere regularity: a
regularly observed feature of certain data under certain conditions. A ‘theory’
is a model, a limited set of processes and relationships that try to provide a
rationale and causal story for those regularities. A ‘hypothesis’ is a specific
application of a theory to a given situation, that makes empirical claims about
what should happen in that situation given the theory. The thesis I’ve tried to
lay out is this: If you admit that these
are the tools for job, you have to admit all the fruits of their labour, not just the ones that serve your purpose.
See you all in 2014. And remember: if you like it, share it.


